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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

:

Brief of Appellant

:
:

BRIAN K. BUSICK,

:

Case No. 930212-CA

Defendant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(g) (1993 Repl. Vol.) provides this
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from an order on a petition
for extraordinary writ sought by an incarcerated appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the District Court err in refusing to consider the issue
of Mr. Busick's alleged illegal detention before the arrival of the
Governor's Warrant and in determining that the documents supporting
the Governor's Warrant were properly executed as well as that
Mr. Busick was timely served with the Governor's Warrant once it
arrived.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal

from a denial of a petition for habeas corpus

relief, this Court must consider the record in the light most
favorable to the findings and judgment of the trial court. Webb v.

Van Per Veur, 853 P.2d 898

(Utah App. 1993), quoting Bundv v.

Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (1988).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Addendum
following

A

to this brief

controlling

Constitution

of

contains

constitutional

Utah, Article

I,

the

and

full

text

of

the

statutory provisions:

Section

7

Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12

(1993

Rep.

Vol.)

(1993 Repl. Vol.)

United States Constitution, Amendment IV (1993 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann., Section 77-30-3 (1993 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann., Section 77-30-10 (1993 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann., Section 77-30-23(3)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 8, 1993, Judge Medley held an evidentiary hearing on
a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Mr. Busick.

The state presented

the testimony of Sergeant Matthew Pavich, a police officer in the
state

of

Arizona.

Officer

Pavich

testified

that

he

had

a

conversation with Mr. Busick in Arizona concerning a homicide the
officer was investigating. T. 16. Sergeant Pavich did not remember
the date of the conversation and did not document the date. T. 18.
The officer testified that at the time of the conversation he took
a polaroid snapshot of the person he was interviewing. T. 18.

The

Officer testified that he also did not record any date or any name
on the photo. T. 18.
evidence.

The Polaroid snapshot was introduced into

The officer further testified that he believed the man

he interviewed to be the man in the court on this date.
2

"The state presented testimony of Deputy Ron Cowdell of the
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office.
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counseI, argued:
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That

Mr.
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person charged with the crime tor which he is sought.
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2.

That

warrant

the

documents

were

not

contained

executed

in the

properly

Governor's

because

the

exemplification contained in the documents is not signed
by the Judge of the Superior Court of Coconino County,
Arizona,

and

yet

the

clerk

of

the

Court

signed,

indicating the validity of the Judge's signature which
was not present.

A

copy of the exemplification

is

attached hereto as "Addendum A."
3.

That the Governor's warrant was not served with

required

speed.

The documents were received by the

Sheriff's office December 21, 1992, but not served until
December 29, 1992.
4.

That

Mr.

See Utah Code Ann. §77-30-10.

Busick

was

unlawfully

October 22, 1992, to October 27, 1992.

detained

from

Mr. Busick was

released on Utah charges on October 22, 1992, pursuant to
an acquittal, however, he continued to be held in jail
until October 27, 1992, when he was brought before a
magistrate and informed of fugitive charges.
Upon conclusion of argument, the court made the following
findings:
1.

That the person in custody is the same person sought

in the extradition request.
2.

That, based on testimony and documents provided,

Mr. Busick is charged with an offense and, further, is a
fugitive.

4

3. The documents contained in the Governor's warrant are
valid.

The documents preceding the exemplification are

properly

executed,

therefore,

the

unsigned

exemplification in question is duplicative and harmless.
4.

This Court will not consider the alleged illegal

detention because such issues should have been brought
before the court earlier and is not appropriate to
consider in the Writ of Habeas Corpus petition.
The Court denied the petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
entered a dismissal in an order signed April 20, 1993.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The documents contained in the Governor's warrant were not
executed properly.

The exemplification from Arizona attests that

the copy of the Indictment included is true and correct.

The

exemplification calls for the signature of the court clerk and then
a judge's signature which authenticates the signature and indicates
that person is the clerk of the court.

The exemplification sent

from Arizona is not signed by the judge.

The lack of this

signature combined with confusion about the date of the alleged
offense which exists in the affidavit of John Verkamp casts doubt
on the veracity of the documents.
Further, Mr. Busick was detained illegally form October 22,
1992, to October 27, 1992 without being brought before a magistrate
for a determination of probable cause to continue to detain him.

5

Once the Governor's warrant did arrive, Mr. Busick was not
served with the papers forthwith as required by Utah Code Ann.
§77-30-10 (as amended).
Lastly, the state did not produce sufficient evidence to rebut
Mr. Busick's proffered evidence that he was not in Arizona at the
time he is alleged to have been present and that he is not the
person sought by Arizona on the alleged offense.

ARGUMENT
I. The documents contained in the Governor's
Warrant were not executed properly.
The State of Arizona included an "EXEMPLIFICATION" with the
documents supporting it's request for a governor's warrant.

See

Addendum B (The Exemplification was introduced at the hearing on
the Writ

held April

8, 1993 as State's Exhibit

2).

In that

exemplification, Shirley Stevenson purports to be the clerk of the
Superior Court of the County of Coconino.

Further, she claims to

have compared the copy of the Bench Warrant and Indictment included
with the original contained in her records.
Following this statement is a certification in which Judge
Charles D. Adams of the Superior Court of Coconino County, State of
Arizona certifies that Shirley Stevenson is in fact clerk of the
Superior Court and that the signature following her statement is
genuine.

However, that prepared statement of Judge Adams does not

contain a signature.
Shirley

Stevenson

then

attests

to

the

authenticity

of

Judge Adams' signature contained in the above statement when, in
6

fact, no signature exists. The fact that Ms. Stevenson vouched to
the authenticity of a signature which apparently did not exist at
the time she signed casts doubt on whether or not Ms. Stevenson
acted appropriately in reviewing the documents. Further, it casts
doubt on the validity of these signatures.
Mr. Busick contends that, as a result of this defect, the
extradition documents on their face raise questions of their
validity.

The importance of the exemplification is that it

authenticates the copy of the Indictment included with the request
for extradition which is required by Utah Code Ann. Section 77-30-3
(1993 Repl. Vol.) and 77-30-23(3) (1993 Repl. Vol.).

Mr. Busick

contends that the exemplification is part of the certification of
the Indictment which is required by statute.
The state argued at the hearing that the exemplification
lacking

the

appropriate

signatures

was

duplicitous

and

not

required.

However, the exemplification which does bear a Judge's

signature

(a different Judge than the one named in the second

exemplification) attests only that Shirley Stevenson is the Court
clerk.

The second exemplification may not be important but the

exemplification which was not signed is particularly important to
the authenticity of the Indictment which holds Mr. Busick.
Moreover, the entire process the Arizona Court used in
completing

these

documents

is

suspect

because

it

appears

Ms. Stevenson has attested to the validity of a signature which
does not exist.

The correct procedure would be for Ms. Stevenson

7

to be present when the Judge signed and only then can she attest to
the validity of the signature.
Further, the documents contain a copy of an Indictment which
alleges the offense in question took place on or about September
29, 1991.

However, the affidavit of John Verkamp, included with

the documents supporting the request for extradition, indicates
that

Mr.

Busick

was

charged

with

the

criminal

offense

on

November 1, 1992. If the date alleged in John Verkamp's affidavit
is accurate; Mr. Busick was held with no formal charges filed in
October of 1992.
believed

At the hearing, Sergeant Pavich testified he

that the affidavit

contained a typographical error,

however, the affiant was not brought to testify and all this Court
has to consider is the documents on their face.

2.
Mr. Busick was detained illegally from
October 22, 1992 to October 27, 1992.
On October 22, 1992, Mr. Busick was acquitted of Utah charges
for which he had been incarcerated.

Mr. Busick was ordered

released from jail immediately pursuant to the acquittal. However,
Mr. Busick continued to be detained in jail without being brought
before a magistrate to explain the reason for his detention until
October 27, 1992.

On that date, Mr. Busick was brought to video

arraignments in the jail and informed he was being held on charges
of being a fugitive out of the state of Arizona.
In his Writ of Habeas Corpus, Mr. Busick argued that this
delay in being brought before a magistrate to be informed of the
reason for his continued detention was unjustified and, therefore,
8

violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution as well as Art. I,
§7 of the Utah Constitution.
In the case of County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U.S.

, 114 L.Ed 2d 49, 111 S. Ct

(1991), the United States

Supreme Court considered the question of how quickly a defendant
incarcerated without a warrant must be taken before a magistrate
for a determination of probable cause.

The Court balanced the

competing interests between the state's interest in "protecting
public

safety by taking

into custody those persons who are

reasonably suspected of having engaged in criminal activity" versus
seeking

to avoid

"prolonged detention based on incorrect or

unfounded suspicion [which] may unjustly 'imperil [a] suspect's
job,

interrupt

his source of

income, and

impair his family

relationships.'" Id. at 60.
The Court concluded that a determination of probable cause
must be made "'either before or promptly after arrest.'" (emphasis
in original).

Id. The Court went on to explain this requirement

did not necessarily mean immediately. Id. The Court emphasized
flexibility taking into account the state's pretrial procedure.
Id. at 61.

However, "flexibility has its limits".

There is no "blank check".

Id.

Id.

at 62.

With these concerns in mind, the

Court considered what period of delay would be acceptable as an
outer

guide.

The

Court

concluded

that

a

probable

cause

determination made within 48 hours of arrest will, "as a general
matter, comply with the promptness requirement . . .". Id. at 63.
9

After that point the burden then shifts to the state to show "a
bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance".

Id.

Moreover, intervening weekends do not qualify as an extraordinary
circumstance.

Id. (emphasis added). The defendant must be taken

before a magistrate as soon as practically possible, "but in no
event later than 48 hours after arrest."

Id.

Mr. Busick argues that the five days he was held before being
brought before a magistrate for a determination of whether probable
cause existed to continue to detain him violated the rule set out
in McLaughlin and, as a result of the delay Mr. Busick's liberty
was

unreasonably

detention

restrained.

is what

Governor's Warrant.

allowed

Further,

Arizona

this

initial

to prepare

and

illegal
submit

a

Illegal detention of Mr. Busick allowed Utah

and Arizona time which they were not entitled to in order to
prepare a case against him.

This type of detention is prohibited

by McLaughlin.

3.
Mr. Busick was not served with the
Governor's Warrant "forthwith" as required by
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-30-10.
Detective Cowdell testified that the Governor's Warrant was
mailed from the Governor's office locally on December 21, 1992.
T.5.

He testified he received the Warrant approximately a day

after that.

T.5.

However, Detective Cowdell did not serve the

Governor's Warrant until December 27, 19 92.
Utah Code Ann.
No person
delivered
authority

T.8.

Section 77-30-10 states in pertinent part;
arrested upon such warrant shall be
over to the agent whom the executive
demanding him shall have appointed
10

to receive him unless he shall first be taken
forthwith before a judge of a court of record
in this state who shall inform him of the
demand made for his surrender and of the crime
with which he is charged and that he has a
right to procure and demand legal counsel ...
(emphasis added)
Mr. Busick contends that he was not taken forthwith before a
Judge as the statute requires.

Mr. Busick7s position is that

"forthwith" as used in the statute imposes a similar responsibility
to that requirement that a defendant held without a warrant be
taken before a magistrate for determination of probable cause.
In Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
S.Ct

, 114 L.Ed2d 49, 111

(1991), discussed previously, the Supreme Court balanced

what it characterized as the competing concerns of flexibility and
practicality taking into consideration the burden on the system,
Id. at 61, and the fact that flexibility cannot be a "blank check".
Id.

Further stating that a state has "no legitimate interest in

detaining for extended periods individuals who have been arrested
without probable cause."

Id.

In balancing the competing concerns

the Court determined that while there is not a rigid-set period of
time in which a person must be taken before a magistrate, 48 hours
will be presumed reasonable promptness.

Id. at 63.

After that

time, the burden shifts to the government to "demonstrate the
existence

of

circumstances."

a

bona

fide

emergency

or

other

extraordinary

Id.

Mr. Busick argues that the requirement upon arrival of a
Governor's Warrant should be considered similar because the judge
in the asylum jurisdiction is required to consider whether this
11

person is in fact being held on existing charges.
Judge

must

consider

whether

a

magistrate

in

Further, the
the

demanding

jurisdiction has made a determination that probable cause exists to
believe a crime has been committed. While the asylum Court is not
making a typical probable cause determination, it is assuring that
a magistrate has found probable cause as reflected in the documents
supporting the warrant.
Appellant's

position

is

that

policy

reasons

exist

for

interpreting "forthwith" in Utah Code Ann. 77-30-10 (as amended)
consistently with other time requirements of determinations of
probable cause. Typically a prisoner has already been held for 3 0
to 60 days waiting for preparation and arrival of the Governor's
Warrant and there is no reason for further delay in service of the
Warrant once it has arrived. Utah authorities simply have to serve
the warrant.

They are not required to complete any additional

paperwork before service.

4. Mr. Busick denies that he is the person
sought by Arizona on the offense alleged.
Under Emig v. Hayward, 703 P. 2d 1043 (Utah 1985) the presence
of a Governor's warrant is prima facie evidence that Mr. Busick is
the person sought by Arizona, however, he is entitled to present
evidence

that he is not the person sought by the demanding

jurisdiction.
Evidence was proffered by the defense at the hearing on the
Writ that Mr. Busick was not in the jurisdiction of Arizona from
mid-August until approximately mid-November. T. 24.
12

Further, the

court observed that the person in the photograph has all of his
teeth while Mr. Busick

is missing

one

front

tooth. T. 24.

Therefore, Mr. Busick did set forth evidence that he is not the
person interviewed in Arizona for the alleged offense.
The state provided no fingerprints from Arizona to compare
with Utah prints to determine if the person is one in the same.
The officer testified it was an oversight on his part. T. 16.
Further, the officer testified from recollection as to the date of
the interview and the date he took the photo because he did not
document any of that information. T. 18.
Mr.

Busick

contends

that

the

officer's

testimony

and

recollection alone is not sufficient to show he is the man Arizona
charged in light of evidence presented by him that he is not the
gentleman charged.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Busick asks this Court to reverse the trial court's order
dismissing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this -y9^day of October, 1993.

SUSAN M. DENHARDT
Attorney for Defendant

'PATRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, SUSAN M. DENHARDT, hereby certify that I have caused eight
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and four copies to the office of the County Attorney,
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this Q 7 ? A day of
October, 1993.

SUSAN M. DENHARDT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

MAILED/DELIVERED this

day of October, 1993.
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ADDENDUM A

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED
STATES
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI

AMENDMENT I
[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.

AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Anns, shall not be infringed.

AMENDMENT HI
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

19

Art. I, § 6

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328.
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am. JUT. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5.
AJLR. — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 8
A.L.R.3d 301.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=»
83(1), 121 to 123.

Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 3.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who are not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah
1974).

ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 2.

A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law *=» 82;
Weapons «» 1, 3, 6 et seq.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.

64

Art. I, § 12

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid
because it delegates to industnal commission
the power to hear, consider and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122
(1920).
Dependents of employee killed by acts of
third party, a stranger to employment, are not

limited to recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act exclusively, unless they have assigned their rights to insurance earner. Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9
(1927).
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile
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criminal trial in order to preserve confidentiality of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55
A.L.R.4th 1196.
False light invasion of privacy—defenses
and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244.
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57
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Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants,
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6.
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77-30-3- Form of demand
must show.

What documents presented

No demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another
state shall be recognized by the governor unless in writing alleging, except in
cases arising under Section 77-30-6, that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and that
thereafter he fled from the state, and accompanied by a copy of an indictment
found or by information supported by affidavit m the state having jurisdiction
of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there,
together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon or by a copy
of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence composed in execution, together
with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the
person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his
bail, probation or parole. The indictment, information or affidavit made before
the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having
committed a crime under the law of that state and the copy of the indictment,
information, affidavit, judgment of conviction or sentence must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand.
History: C. 1953, 77-30-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit based on hearsay
Affidavit requirement.
Authentication
Sufficiency of demand
Affidavit based on hearsay.
Extradition warrant can be issued on the basis of an affidavit based on hearsay. Langley v
Hayward, 656 P 2d 1020 (Utah 1982).
Affidavit requirement
An affidavit is not required with the extradition papers when the charge is contained in an
indictment found by the grand jury Ludahl v.
Larson, 586 P 2d 439 (Utah 1978).
Authentication.
In extradition proceedings under former
statute, authentication of papers attached or
annexed to requisition was sufficient, although
governor did not certify to genuineness of annexed papers, where provisions of federal statutes were substantially complied with Bell v
Corless, 57 Utah 604, 196 P 568 (1921)
Authentication required was that of the governor of the demanding state; requirement was
satisfied by first sentence of request for extradition signed by the demanding state's governor declaring that the annexed papers had
been authenticated in accordance with laws of
that state Birmingham v Larson, 26 Utah 2d
414, 490 P2d 893 (1971)

Sufficiency of demand.
In habeas corpus proceedings by fugitive
from another state, affidavits for requisition
that contained positive and direct statements
of fact and charged in direct terms the commission of crime were sufficient Harris v.
Burbidge, 58 Utah 392, 199 P 663 (1921).
Where one was accused of being fugitive
from justice from state demanding his extradition, it was held in habeas corpus proceeding
that court did not err in denying petitioner
right to introduce evidence tending to show
that he was not fugitive from justice and that
affidavits in support of requisition were false,
since surrendering state had no legal right to
take evidence or attempt to inquire into facts
constituting :nme by going behind positive
statements of requisition affidavits nor to
question sufficiency of such papers in any way
when it appeared upon their face that they met
requirements of statute Harris v. Burbidge, 58
Utah 392, 199 P 663 (1921).
Where a demand of the state of Oregon for
extradition was written, alleged the presence
of the plaintiff in the state of Oregon at the
time of the alleged crime and that he fled from
the state thereafter, and had attached a number of documents which the governor certified
to be authentic and true, the demand for extradition complied with the requirements of former section Little v Beckstead, 11 Utah 2d
270, 358 P2d 93 (1961)
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History: C. 1953, 77-30-9, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 35 C.J.S. Extradition § 12.
Key Numbers. — Extradition *=» 37.

77-30-10. Time to apply for habeas corpus allowed.
No person arrested upon such warrant shall be delivered over to the agent
whom the executive authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive
him unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court of record
in this state who shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender and
of the crime with which he is charged and that he has the right to demand and
procure legal counsel and if the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he or
they desire to test the legality of his arrest, the judge of such court of record
shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed him within which to apply for a writ
of habeas corpus. When such writ is applied for, notice thereof and the time
and place of hearing thereon shall be given to the prosecuting officer of the
county in which the arrest is made and in which the accused is in custody, and
to the said agent of the demanding state.
History: C. 1953, 77-30-10, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. — Courts of record enumerated, § 78-1-2.

Habeas corpus, Utah Const., Art. I, § 5;
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B(f).
Right to counsel, Utah Const., Art. I, § 12;
§§ 77-1-6, Rule 7 U.R.Cr.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

den was then upon the prisoner to offer convincing proof that he was not the person deBurden of proof.
manded. Mora v. Larson, 540 P.2d 520 (Utah
—Identity of fugitive.
1975).
Challenging validity of process.
extradition has the burden
P e r s o n n^^g
Illegal means.
to
p r o v e that he is not the person named in the
Necessity for appeal.
rendition warrant, or that the information does
not state a crime under the law of the demandBurden of proof.
ing state, or that he was not in the demanding
Habeas corpus petitioner who denies that he state when the alleged crime was committed,
is a fugitive from justice has the burden of Phillips v. Vance, 594 P.2d 885 (Utah 1979).
proving that fact by clear and convincing eviState has the burden of proving that the perdence. Langley v. Hayward, 656 P.2d 1020 son arrested is the person named in the extra(Utah 1982).
dition papers, and a prima facie case is estabIdentity of fugitive
lished where the state shows that the arrested
Petitioner was entitled to release in habeas Pf"™ h a s o r i s ^ w n by the same name as
corpus proceedings prior to execution of extra- * * appearing on the papers; where state has
dition since the state of Utah did not produce m a d e a P™*3 fac * e <***> ^ e h a b e a s «nnis P*j
any means of identifying him except his first titioner has the burden of going forward with
and last name, and it was alleged that there affirmative evidence that he is not the person
were at least four other persons in Salt Lake named in the papers, and where he does so, the
area bearing the same first and last names, state is required to corroborate the petitioner's
Madsen v. Larsen, 527 P.2d 227 (Utah 1974). identity with the person named in the extradiIn extradition proceedings a prima facie case tion papers, and where the state so corrobowas made by the governor's rendition warrant rates, the court must weigh the evidence and
and by showing that prisoner had the same make a finding on the issue of identity. Langname as that of the wanted man, and the bur- ley v. Hayward, 656 P.2d 1020 (Utah 1982).
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agent, commanding him to receive the person so charged if delivered to him
and convey him to the proper officer of the county in this state in which the
offense was committed.
History: C. 1953, 77-30-22, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 35 C.J.S. Extradition §§ 4-6, 16.
Key Numbers. — Extradition *» 23-26, 36.

77-30-23. Fugitives from this state — Applications for requisition for return.
(1) When the return to this state of a person charged with a crime in this
state is required, the prosecuting attorney shall present to the governor his
written application for a requisition for the return of the person charged, in
which application shall be stated the name of the person so charged, the crime
charged against him, the approximate time, place, and circumstances of its
commission, the state in which he is believed to be, including the location of
the accused therein at the time the application is made, and certifying that in
the opinion of the said prosecuting attorney the ends of justice require the
arrest and return of the accused to this state for trial and that the proceeding
is not instituted to enforce a private claim.
(2) When the return to this state is required of a person who has been
convicted of a crime in this state and has escaped from confinement or broken
the terms of his bail, probation, or parole, the prosecuting attorney of the
county in which the offense was committed, the parole board, or the warden of
the institution or sheriff of the county from which escape was made shall
present to the governor a written application for a requisition for the return of
such person, in which application shall be stated the name of the person, the
crime of which he was convicted, the circumstances of his escape from confinement, or of the breach of the terms of his bail, probation, or parole, the state in
which he is believed to be, including the location of the person therein at the
time application is made.
(3) The application shall be verified by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicate, and shall be accompanied by two certified copies of the indictment returned, or information and affidavit filed, or of the complaint made to the
judge or magistrate stating the offense with which the accused is charged, or
of the judgment or conviction, or of the sentence.
The prosecuting officer, parole board, warden, or sheriff may also attach
such further affidavits and other documents in duplicate as he shall deem
proper to be submitted with such application. One copy of the application with
the action of the governor indicated by endorsement thereon and one of the
certified copies of the indictment, complaint, information, and affidavits or of
the judgment of conviction or of the sentence shall be filed in the office of the
governor to remain of record in that office. The other copies of all papers shall
be forwarded with the governor's requisition.
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ADDENDUM 8

EXEMPLIFICATION

STATE OF ARIZONA )
County of Coconino)

ss#

I,
Shirley F. Stevenson
, Clerk of the Sunerior Court of
the County of Coconino, State ot Arizona, do hereby c e r t i f y and a t t e s t
the foregoing to be a f u l l , true and correct cony of the o r i g i n a l
State of Arizona vs. Brian K. Busickf case no. 17020? Bench Warrant and
Indictment

on f i l e in my o f f i c e , and that I have c a r e f u l l y compared the same with the
original
State of Arizona vs. Brian K. Busick, Case No. 17020; Bench Warrant and
Indictment

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and annexed the Seal
of the Superior Court of Coconino County, State of Arizona, this 4th
day
of
December
f 19 92
(SEAL).:
^ior Court of Coconino
County, St^fe of Arizona
By
Deputy Clerk

STATE OF ARIZONA )
County of Coconino)

gs

I,
Charles D. Adams
, Jud^e of the Superior Court
of Coconino County, State of Arizona, do hereby certify that
Shirley F. Stevenson
is Clerk of the Superior Court ot Coconino
County, State of Arizona (which Court is a Court of Record, having a seal;)
that the signature to the foregoing certificate and attestation is the
genuine signature of the said
Shirley F. Stevenson
.
as such officer; that the seal annexed thereto is the seal of said Suoericr
Court; that said
Shirley F. Stevenson
_ ^
as such clerk, is the proper officer to execute the said certificate and
attestation, and that said attestation is in due form according to the
laws of the State of Arizona.

foresaid,

this

4th * day of

rl^Lli

Fla

6 s t a f f A County and State
19 92

Judge or the Superior Court or Coconino
County, State of Arizona

STATE OF ARIZONA ) s g
County of Coconino)

Shirley F. Stevenson
Clerk of the Superior
Joconino County, State 0of
Arizona,
(which
Court is a Court of
a
Record, having
a
seal
which
?
" n ±e A r } 2 0 nhoram
' ' ^ i^c A~
h Court
is a Court of
ring
a
seal,
I
wwhich
h l c h 1is
S a nannexed
CharlesV * £ £ '
^ d hereto,) do hereby^---certify that
to
W h S e n a m e i s sub
'" the
" u ~ toregomg certiiicate of due aarrocr^'
°
scribed
tte
Oe
I *f l u e
signing the°«amS.
Judge
of
t
h
"
^
i
o
n
"
w
a
s , at
the
time
of
rh« *,~* ,..,_ "
. . P e n attestation
was,
at
the
time
of
C
lrt
commissioned, qualified nd
S
\
°
i
aforesaid,
and
was
duly
f
And I do further certify ? h a ? t h f c ? e d ^ l a V ° e x e c u C e s a i d certificate,
the said c . r t l f i c . t . % £ 7 ^
above named to
S e a l 0XfN S ? ? S . 5 5 E S S r t I ^ T n T ^ ° *" " h a « d ™* - n e x e d the
p e r i
December
^ 9 C 2 0urt > « *V o f f i c e in said County, t h i s 4th
day of

(SEAL)

Jii

Lerk dr^^^.jggp'erior Court of Coconino
;ounty# Srate of Arizona

